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H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.'
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)2
has become a routine addition to civil actions which, before 1980, would
never have seemed appropriate under a statute relating to "racketeer-
ing." The statute provides for treble damages and attorney's fees which
make it alluring.3 Its open-ended language allows broad application.
In fact, Congress intentionally drafted RICO broadly to snare the widest
range of defendants.4 In the years since its inception, however, the
original intention of Congress has been undercut by the problems
resulting from the statute's lack of clarity.
The requirement that a pattern of racketeering activity exist for
RICO is one such ambiguity in the statute. In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,' the Supreme Court recently attempted to put an
end to confusion in the lower courts as to what constitutes a pattern of
racketeering activity. The Court rejected the restrictive Eighth Circuit
"multiple scheme" requirement. 6 The Eighth Circuit test required that
the defendant be engaged in two or more schemes constituting a
"pattern" for RICO.7 This ambiguous requirement allowed the Eighth
Circuit to dismiss every civil RICO claim until H.J. Inc.' The Supreme
Court replaced the multiple scheme test with its own interpretation of
pattern and held that a pattern is "a closed period of repeated conduct,
or ... past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a
threat of repetition."' Shortly before the H.J. Inc. decision,10 a new
1. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
4. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905
(1989).
5. Id.
6. Id at 2899.
7. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 61-62, and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Eighth Circuit multiple scheme requirement.
9. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902. For a complete discussion of the holding in
H.J. Inc., see notes 63-139 and accompanying text.
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bill, H.R. 1046," was introduced in the House of Representatives to
amend the RICO statute. 2 Currently, H.R. 1046 is silent about the
pattern requirement.'
3
After discussing the pattern requirement set out in H.J. Inc., this
Note will propose, in lieu of H.R. 1046, a new statutory definition of
pattern. This new definition would resolve several problems created by
the present RICO statute and H.J. Inc.'s interpretation of "pattern."
Section I reviews the RICO statute.'4 Section III examines how courts
have interpreted the statute to define "pattern."'15 It also includes a
discussion of the H.J. Inc. holding and the new definition of "pat-
tern."'" Finally, section III proposes a new definition of "pattern"
which could be appended to the statute through H.R. 1046.1'
I. THE RICO STATUTE
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 (OCCA).'8 As the name suggests, its purpose was "to destroy
the power of organized crime groups."19 The statute allows for civil2"
and criminal2' actions. Under civil RICO, a plaintiff may recover
treble damages and attorney's fees.
22
The elements of a RICO claim have been condensed by one scholar
into a checklist of key terms: "[the plaintiff must show he suffered] (1)
an injury in his business or property because the defendant (2) while
involved in one or more enumerated relationships with an enterprise (3)
10. H.J. Inc. was decided on June 26, 1989.
11. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
12. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text for amendments to RICO
in H.R. 1046.
13. See H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
14. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 63-139 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 140-151 and accompanying text.
18. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 4 Stat. 922
(codified as amended in various sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
19. PRESIDENT'S COISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRvME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967); see also
Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TuL.
MAR. L.J. 19, 20 (1987); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249-80 (1982).
"20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (b) (1988).
21. Id. § 1963.
22. Id. § 1964(c).
352 [Vol. 55
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PATTERN REQUIREMENT
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity."'  It is helpful to
recognize these terms as they appear in the statute because they
produce the bulk of litigation.
Civil RICO is located in Title 18 sections 1961-68 of the United
States Code.24 A walk-through of the statute begins with section
1964(c) which requires that to maintain a civil action the plaintiff be
"injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962."25 Turning to section 1962, a violation occurs under subsection
(c) if the defendant was "employed or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt."'
23. Abrams, supra note 19, at 25.
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
25. Id- § 1964(c) (emphasis added). Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id- Sedima S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479,494 (1985), established that an injury under this section did not have
to be one that places the victim at a competitive disadvantage in the market-
place, or be an actual racketeering injury of the type normally associated with
organized crime to count as an injury.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Subsection (c) is the
subsection under which civil RICO actions are most commonly brought. There
are three other subsections in section 1962:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part
of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating
in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not
be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or
their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in
the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one
class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one
or more directors of the issuer.
1990]
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Section 1961 defines some of the terms used in section 1962.
"Racketeering activity" is defined in section 1961(1) by a listing of
applicable federal and state laws which satisfy the preliminary activity
requirement, commonly referred to as "predicate acts," which must have
occurred to allege RICO.28 Included in 1961(1) are such crimes as
murder, kidnapping, and extortion-crimes which satisfy traditional
notions of organized crime. 29 Others, such as mail and wire fraud and
fraud in the sale of securities, are somewhat of a surprise for a
racketeering statute. These inclusions have the effect of greatly
expanding the application of the statute against businesses as opposed
to traditional organized crime networks. 0
Section 1961(5) defines "pattern of racketeering" as requiring "at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity.' 1 By requiring "two acts of rack-
eteering activity," this subsection refers to the predicate acts listed in
section 1961(1).12 Thus, the statute's only attempt to define "pattern"
is its requirement of "at least" two section 1961(1) predicate acts. It was
this broad language that opened the door for judicial interpretation.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id. § 1962(a), (b), (d).
27. Section 1961(4) defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or. other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1988). The Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87
(1981), that an "enterprise" includes illegitimate as well as legitimate entities.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) for a complete list of the various federal
and state violations which qualify as predicate acts for a RICO allegation.
29. See id.
30. See Abrams, supra note 19, at 42 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(b), (d)
(1988)).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
32. Id § 1961(1).
[Vol. 55
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/11
PATTERN REQUIREMENT
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "PATERN"
A. Background
Civil RICO actions began to blossom in the early 1980's.' "The
first Supreme Court decision addressing the "pattern" element was
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 4 Sedima held that a prior conviction of
a predicate act, racketeering injury (as defined above), or of RICO was
not necessary to an action under section 1964(c) of the statute.3
Sedima brought RICO specifically into the civil arena and the Court
held that no separate racketeering injury, beyond proving injury from
the predicate acts themselves, needs to be shown.9 In reaching its
decision, the Court looked to statutory language and legislative history
to infer congressional intent.37 An underlying conflict with RICO has
been whether it is designed exclusively for traditional organized crime
members or for any person or business engaging in criminal activity
that resembles the sort of activity engaged in by organized crime. The
Court noted that Congress was aware of the potential for RICO's abuse
because it passed the statute "over the dissent of three members, who
feared the treble damages provision would be used for malicious
33. See Sedima S.P. R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985). RICO has
been far-reaching. More colorful defendants have included: the Ku Klux Klan,
see Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198 (S.D. Tex. 1982); the Church of Scientology, see Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982); lawyers and law firms, see
Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1986); Butchers Union
Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986); Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
34. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
35. See id. At 500; see also Abrams, supra note 19, at 20 ("Not only did
lawmakers recognize that proving organized-crime membership had traditionally
been difficult and often impossible; they also concluded that an express
organized-crime prohibition might have led courts to strike down RICO for
creating an unconstitutional status defense.").
36. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493-500.
37. See id at 487. The Court used the following legislative sources:
Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 35,295
(1970); S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Measures Relating to
Organized Crime, Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 388
(1969) (statement of Rep. Poff); 116 CONG. REc. 35,313 (1970) (statement of Rep.
Minish); Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970); 116 CoNG. REc. 6,993-
94 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REC.
35,342 (1970); 115 CONG. REc. 6,995 (1969) (ABA Comments on S. 2048).
1990]
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harassment of business competitors."38 After reviewing the legislative
history, the Sedima Court concluded: "It is true that private civil
actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against such
defendants, rather than the archetypical, intimidating mobster. Yet this
defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its
correction must lie with Congress."
3 9
The Court discussed whether RICO was intended to apply only to
traditional "gangsters" or to anyone engaged in section 1961 criminal
activity:
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the
"extraordinary, if not outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has been
put. Instead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals,
it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against
"respected and legitimate enterprises." Yet Congress wanted to reach
both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The former enjoy
neither an inherent capacity for criminal activity nor immunity from
its consequences. 4°
In Sedima the Court addressed "pattern" for the first time. It broke
"pattern" down into a two-prong test: relationship and continuity.41
The Court concluded in an often quoted footnote:
Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally form a
"pattern." The legislative history supports the view that two isolated
acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern ... . The
infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one
"racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to be
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern.42
As one scholar has observed, "Sedima made the pattern element
RICO's newest major battleground."43  The language of Sedima's
footnote scattered the circuit courts in various directions in developing
a test for "pattern." For a time, the Second Circuit represented the most
liberal application, holding that "two predicate acts suffice to establish
a RICO pattern.... The Second Circuit emphasized "enterprise"
38. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 487 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1970)).
39. Id at 499.
40. Id. at 524.
41. Id. at 496.
42. Td. (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
43. Abrams, supra note 19, at 46.
44. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1377 (2d Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 55
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instead of "pattern," and required a "'continuing operation' under section
1962(c), by showing 'an ongoing organization' and 'evidence that the
various units function as a continuing unit" to show an "enterprise.
"i45
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of pattern required only that the
acts be "separate transactions" even if they were part of a single
scheme.4" The Eleventh Circuit held that "a series of predicate acts
related to one fraudulent scheme or criminal episode can constitute a
pattern [so long as] each act constitutes a separate violation of federal
or state law listed in section 1961(1) 'irrespective of the circumstances
under which [the acts] arose. '"'4
Other circuits decided RICO cases without developing a specific
test. The Sixth Circuit held that two acts as part of a single count are
sufficient for a pattern. 48 The Ninth Circuit held that "a series of acts
that were part of a single scheme constituted a RICO pattern because
they posed [a] threat of continuing activity. "49 The First Circuit held
that "several acts of mail and wire fraud in furtherance of a single
isolated bribe (paid in three installments) did not constitute a pat-
tern."50 The Fourth Circuit held that a single scheme was not
sufficient.5
The Eighth Circuit first confronted the pattern element of RICO in
Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer.52 Superior Oil brought a civil RICO action
against a former employee and two 6fficers for wrongful conversion of
liquid petroleum gas. 53  The court entered judgment for Superior
Oil.5 The panel sustained the wrongful conversion claim but reversed
the RICO claim.' The court used Sedima to establish the Eighth
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
47. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1380 (quoting Bank of America Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1986)).
48. Id. (quoting United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 .(6th Cir.
1988)).
49. Id. at 1381 (citing Sun Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194
(9th Cir. 1987)).
50. Id (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.
1987)).
51. Id. (citing International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154-
155 (4th Cir. 1987)).
52. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
53. Id at 253.
54. Id The jury returned a verdict on the RICO claim for $26,397.70, which
the court then trebled. Id-
55. Id- at 254.
1990]
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Circuit "multiple scheme" test.' In Superior Oil the court used
Sedima,57 legislative history," and a Second Circuit decision 9 to
conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the continuity prong of
the pattern element for RICO because "the record reveal[ed] one isolated
fraudulent scheme."'
After Superior Oil, the Eighth Circuit used its multiple scheme test
to dismiss every civil RICO claim prior to H.J. InC.6' The Eighth
Circuit "multiple scheme" test was by far the most restrictive test for
pattern. One scholar likened the Eighth Circuit test to a catch-22:
[Once the] underlying acts of fraud are sufficiently disparate to
constitute entirely separate schemes .... then they are unlikely to be
sufficiently connected to meet the "continuity plus relationship"
requirement of Sedima. But if, conversely, the underlying acts of
fraud form a continuous and interrelated pattern sufficient to satisfy
Sedima, they are likely to be viewed together as a single scheme, and
thus fail to satisfy the Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme require-
ment.6
2
B. H.J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
As a result of the widespread confusion over the definition of
"pattern" among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
56. Id. at 257; see Abrams, supra note 19, at 46-47. "Sedima made the
pattern element civil RICO's newest major battleground .... The Eighth
Circuit's 'multiple scheme' test and the Second Circuits 'continuing enterprise'
test highlight the polar extremes." Id
57. Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257.
58. Id at 257 n.7. The Court stated: "Although our research reveals no
judicial interpretations of [the] pattern requirement, the legislative holding
behind this element indicates that it was intended to isolate the professional,
long-term criminal elements in society." Id.; see 116 CONG. REc. 847 (daily ed.
Jan. 22, 1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
59. 785 F.2d at 257 (citing Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615
F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Ill. 1985)).
60. Id.; see Abrams, supra note 19, at 49. No other circuit adopted the
Eighth Circuit "multiple scheme" test. See also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 426 n.6 (D. Minn. 1986).
61. See, e.g., Phoenix Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Sherson Loeb R. Hoades, 856 F.2d
1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988); Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); Holanberg v. Morrisette, 800 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1986); Sinan v.
Frebourg, 650 F. Supp. 319 (D. Minn. 1986); Clodfelter v. Thurston, 637 F.
Supp. 1034 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Allbright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeteri, 631 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
62. Rakoff, The Crazy Quilt "Pattern" N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1988, at 3, 32.
[Vol. 55
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H.J. Inc., to decide the pattern issue.0 The court pointed to the
inclusion of mail and wire fraud" and lack of express direction in the
statute itself as requiring an expansive reading of the term "pattern.'65
The Court granted certiorari because Congress had done nothing after
.Sedima's initial invitation for legislative clarification, and the various
courts of appeals were producing widely disparate views."
H.J. Inc. was a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of
business in Minnesota.' H.J. Inc. and other individually named
plaintiffs each purchased products and services from the defendant,
Northwestern Bell Telephone Company.69 The defendants included
members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Union Commission (MPUC),
counsel for the Minnesota Telephone Association, and officers and
employees of Northwestern Bell."0
The plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern Bell, through the other
defendants as agents, "initiated a scheme designed to illegally influence
various members of the MPUC, the regulatory body that sets rates
which Northwestern Bell may charge for [its] goods and services."7'
The scheme generally involved making illicit payments and offers of
benefits to MPUC commissioners in an effort to influence them to use
their positions for the benefit of Northwestern Bell.' The plaintiffs
brought a class action in United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota against Northwestern Bell and other defendants, seeking
damages for statutory73 and common law bribery.74 In addition, the
63. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2897. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also
dismissed the RICO claim because it did not meet the requirement for
enterprise. The Supreme Court declined to address this issue. Id at 2898 n.1.
The dispute over "enterprise" is whether there must be an enterprise proven
separately from the defendant. Id The lower court held in the affirmative. 648
F. Supp. at 428-29.
64. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900; see Abrams, supra note 19, at 42 (civil
RICO has been likened to a treasure hunt where non-racketeers ar pursued
using wire, mail, and securities fraud).
65. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
66. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 524.
67. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899.
68. H.J. Inc., 648 F. Supp. at 419-20.
69. Id at 420.
70. Id.
71. I& at 421.
72. Id
73. See MINN. STAT. § 609.42.1(1), (2) (1988).
74. H.J. Inc., 648 F. Supp. at 421.
1990)
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plaintiffs sought recovery under section 1964(c) of RICO,7 5 suing for
treble damages and an injunction against the defendants.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court
held that the plaintiffs had not alleged a pattern of racketeering activity
because the defendants' acts constituted a single scheme which, by
itself, did not satisfy the Eighth Circuit's definition of pattern. 7 'Te
Eighth Circuit required multiple schemes to satisfy the pattern
element.7 8  The district court dismissed the two bribery claims as
well.79 The court discussed other elements of civil RICO, but held that
"plaintiffs failure to satisfy the continuity prong of the Sedima pattern
test is fully dispositive of plaintiffs RICO claims."'8  On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.8 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
remanded the cause."2 All nine Justices rejected the Eighth Circuit
view. The Supreme Court provided its own interpretation of the pattern
requirement for RICO and held:
(1) "pattern" is a two prong test requiring relationship between
predicate acts, and continuity; 
8 3
(2) two predicate acts alone do not satisfy the relationship prong;84
(3) relationship is proved by showing "criminal acts that have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and are not isolated;"8
(4) continuity is "a closed period of repeated conduct, or ... past
conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat
of repetition;80
(5) to establish continuity the conduct must have lasted at least a
few weeks or months;
87
75. Id. at 422.
76. Id
77. I& at 425.
78. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986) (established
the Eighth Circuit multiple scheme test).
79. H.J. Inc., 648 F. Supp. at 430.
80. Id. at 426.
81. H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650.
82. 109 S. Ct. at 2906.
83. Id. at 2900.
84. Id
85. Id at 2901.
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(6) a pattern does not require that the perpetrator have been
involved in traditional organized criminal activity.88
The Court began its discussion of the pattern requirement by
describing what "pattern!' is not. It held that a pattern is not estab-
lished by two predicate acts with nothing more.8 9 Noting that section
1961(5) states that "pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity,"90 the Court re-emphasized Sedima in
which it decided that this language meant two predicate acts and
something more must be established to find a pattern.9 ' The Court
relied on Senator McClellan's comments to suggest that two predicate
acts alone do not satisfy pattern9 and that the predicate acts do not
have to be "indicative of a perpetrator involved in organized crime or its
functional equivalent."9
Seeking to fulfill legislative intent,9 the Court used the plain
meaning of the word "pattern" as taken from the Oxford English
Dictionary. Pattern is defined as "an arrangement or order of things or
activity.""o Building on this, the Court reasoned that a specific number
of predicate acts will not of itself constitute an "arrangement."96 The
predicates must show a relationship to each other or to "some external
organizing principle."' The Court noted that the statutory language
does not shed any light on determining what form the relationship
should take.
98
Based on the absence of direction in the statute itself, and the open-
ended definition of pattern in section 1961(5),9 the court concluded
that the legislative history of the act should determine the meaning of
pattern.'(° The Court turned to its own decisions which discussed the
88. Id at 2905.
89. Id. at 2900.
90. Id. at 2899 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988)).
91. Id.; see Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
92. 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (citing 116 CoNG. REC. 18,940 (1970)).
93. Id
94. Id; see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) (ordinary
meaning of statutory language is assumed to be legislature's intent).
95. 11 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTioNARY 357 (2d ed. 1989).
96. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
97. Id
98. Id
99. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
definition of pattern in section 1961(5).
100. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
1990]
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legislative history of RICO,' ° ' and used its own two-prong relation-
ship/continuity test for "pattern."'0 2 A definition from another section
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), of which RICO is
Title IX, was inserted to define the relationship prong."° A relation-
ship is shown between predicate acts if it "embraces criminal acts that
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events. "1t 4 The Court thus defined
what was needed to show a relationship between predicate acts.
Sedima's second prong, continuity, was deemed a separate inquiry
from relationship.'05 The continuity prong was the real dispute in
H.J. Inc. because it was this aspect of "pattern" that the Eighth Circuit
had interpreted as requiring multiple schemes."°6 The Court stated
that the multiple scheme test is "highly relevant" as to whether
continuity is satisfied."° Yet the Court refused to require the multi-
ple scheme test. First, the Court noted that the test was a creation of
the Eighth Circuit, and is not in the actual statutory language of RICO
or the relevant legislative history.'l 8 Second, the Court reasoned that
adding the multiple scheme test would solve nothing because to do so
would merely replace the need for defining "continuity" with a need to
define "scheme.
1°9
The Court defined "continuity" as a "closed period of repeated
conduct, or... past conduct that by its nature projects into the future
with a threat of repetition.""0 To satisfy continuity, the predicate acts
101. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486-90; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
26-29 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (cases where the
Supreme Court interpreted RICO using legislative history).
102. 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14).
103. See The Dangerous Special Offender Act, Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e) (1988)).
104. Id.
105. 109 S. Ct. at 2900.
106. Id. at 2901; see 829 F.2d at 650 (lower court opinion).
107. 109 S. Ct. at 2901.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2902. There seems to be an inconsistency in the Court's
description of continuity. The Court first defined continuity as an "open- or
close-ended" concept. Id. It described close-ended as "a closed period of
repeated conduct," and open-ended as "conduct that by its nature projects into
the future with a threat of repetition." Id. The Court then added, "a party
alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by
proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future
[Vol. 55
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would have to extend at least "a few weeks or months" and continuously
threaten criminal activity."' In a footnote, the majority stated that
Congress intended the statute to apply to long-term criminal activity,
regardless of whether criminal activity considered appropriate for this
act could be carried out in a very short period."2 Satisfaction of the
test for continuity depends upon the facts of each case." 3 The Court
concluded its discussion of continuity and relationship by adding that
"the development of these concepts must await future cases, absent a
decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to
the Act's intended scope.""
It was argued that the pattern requirement should be construed so
as to include only racketeering activities resembling organized crime in
"the traditional sense" or "organized crime perpetrators.""' 5  The
Court, again turning to statutory language and legislative history, held
that the pattern element should not be limited in this way, stating, "the
argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern
concept, whatever the merits and demerits of such a limitation as an
initial legislative matter, finds no support in the Act's text, and is at
odds with the tenor of its legislative history."" 6 Looking first at
RICO's language, the Court found no evidence that the statute was
meant to apply to an association exclusively rather than an individ-
ual. 7  Traditional organized crime, the Court reasoned, necessarily
requires more than one individual." 8 Second, the Court noted that
although "organized crime" could have been used in the language of
RICO defining pattern, and has been used in other provisions of the
criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement." Id. (emphasis added).
By definition, "'open-ended' predicate acts" means acts threatening future
criminal activity. The Court is apparently requiring "close-ended" predicate acts
to threaten future activity as well. Yet, the definition of "closed-ended"
necessarily entails a "closed period." Requiring both open- and close-ended
predicate acts to threaten future activity seems to negate the very distinction
between the two unless an unexpressed meaning is meant by the terms. See id.
at 2907-08 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing other problems with this
language).
111. Id. at 2902.
112. Id at 2902 n.4.
113. Id
114. I&
115. Id at 2902-03; see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for
discussion of this proposition. A constant tension exists over whether RICO was
meant to be applied to traditional "gangsters" or anyone engaging in the
specified criminal activity.





Bioff: Bioff: RICO's Pattern Requirement
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
OCCA, it was not included and, therefore, should not be read into the
statute.n 9
Turning to the legislative history of RICO, the Court suggested that
"Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious
language capable of extending beyond organized crime.""2 Organized
criminal activity was not intended as a requirement for several reasons.
"Organized crime" is almost impossible to define.' 2 Furthermore,
traditional organized criminal activity is breaking down and crossing
the line into "legitimate enterprises. " 12 Finally, Congress purposely
drafted a broad statute to encompass many crimes and perpetrators.
Restricting the statute to organized criminal activity would stifle this
purpose." The Court concluded its analysis by noting that while
"RICO may be a poorly drafted statute ... rewriting it is a job for
Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this court."1 " Applying its
analysis to H.J. Inc., the Court held that H.J. Inc.'s allegations that
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. engaged in bribery over a six year
period were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.'
2 5
Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion, and was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy. The concurrence agreed that a
single scheme could constitute a pattern and, thus, the lower court order
was properly overturned." Those concurring thought the majority
opinion only further confused what is required to constitute a pat-
tern. 7 Among its complaints, the concurrence took exception to the
majority's new "open- and close-ended concept" approach to the
continuity prong of the pattern requirement 2 8 It noted that "virtual-
ly all allegations of racketeering activity... will relate to past periods
119. Id. The Court compared RICO with the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 90,351, § 601(b), 82 Stat. 209
(1968), which defines organized crime. 109 S. Ct. at 2905. Amici argued that
OCCA's preamble which states the purpose of RICO to be "the eradication of
organized crime in the United States," supported the narrowing of pattern to
include only traditional organized crime elements." Id The Court refused to
accept this argument. Id. at 2904.
120. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2904. The court cited Senator McClellan, 116
CONG. REc. 18,913-914 (1970), and Rep. Poff, 116 CONG. REC. 35, 204 (1970).
121. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905. Representative Poff brought out a related
problem with narrowing the statute to organized crime: the implications in
criminal law of making status an element of a crime. 116 CONG. REc. at 35,204.
122. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905.
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id. at 2906.
126. Id. at 2909.
127. Id. at 2908.
128. Id. at 2907.
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that are 'closed' (unless one expects plaintiff... to establish that the
defendant not only committed the crimes he did, but is still committing
them)."'" The concurrence pointed out that a possible interpretation
of "closed ended" is a single scheme which would not fall under RICO
unless it threatened to continue into the future."3 If this were so,
"open ended" would have-to mean "multiple schemes" sufficient to fall
under RICO alone.' 3 ' This interpretation was rejected because the
majority rejected the Eighth Circuit multiple scheme test; therefore,
"open ended" would not be used in this way. 3 2  The concurrence
seemed to imply that use of the language "open- and close-ended" for the
continuity prong injects new language into the statute. The concurrence
pointed out that multiple schemes could not be used to explain "open-
and close-ended" because the majority rejected it for "introducing a
concept.., that appears nowhere in the language or legislative history
of the Act."'3
The concurrence took exception as well to the definition used for the
"relationship prong" of the pattern element.'M The objection was
based on the rule stated in Russello v. United States' 5 that if there
is particular language in one section of a statute but not in another, it
is presumed that the language was included or excluded intentionally.
This meant that the majority should not have used the definition for
"relatedness" taken from section 3575 (e),'" another section of the
OCCA.137 The concurrence objected to the minimum time limit of "a
few weeks or months" placed on the continuity-prong of patter s3 8 It
felt this minimum of a few weeks meant that a short period of 'rack-
eteering activity was "free" for the defendant. 39 It did not mention,
however, the majority's rejection of the idea that RICO should be





133. Id- at 2907-08.
134. Id. at 2907.
135. 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
136. The Dangerous Special Offender Act, Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3575(e) (1988)).
137. 109 S. Ct. at 2907.
138. Id.
139. Id at 2908.
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III. LEGISLATIVE "PATTERN" DEFINITION
Several members of the House of Representatives have introduced
House Bill 104614" which would amend the RICO statute.141 Major
additions in H.R. 1046 include: (1) a government entity may now bring
a civil RICO action, (2) a statute of limitations which provides that a
civil action may not be commenced "after the latest of four years after
the date the cause of action accrues," (3) an affirmative defense if the
defendant "acted in good faith and in reliance upon an official, directly
applicable regulatory action ... by an authorized federal or state
.agency," and (4) federal RICO actions are under exclusive federal
jurisdiction.'42  H.R. 1046, however, is silent about the pattern
element.'43 A definition of pattern modeled after state RICO pattern
definitions should be included in H.B. 1046 to amend the current federal
RICO statute. Adding an appropriate definition of pattern into H.R.
1046 could help alleviate some major problems with RICO, and would
afford a better result than continued silence which would allow H.J.
Inc.'s pattern interpretation to stand.
Several state RICO statutes contain more specific language than
federal RICO to explain what is required for a pattern.4 4  At least
twelve states define pattern as "criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and
are not isolated.' 145 This language is from Title X of the Dangerous
140. H.R. 1046 was picked for this Note because it is immediately available.
This Note advocates revising RICO to include a definition of "pattern" through
any means, however, including future bills introduced to the floor.
141. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
142. Id-
143. The proposed bill would change "pattern of racketeering" in Section
1961(5) to "pattern of unlawful activity." See id. at 11. This change is to avoid
problems with the word "racketeering" and does not affect the pattern element.
144. Federal RICO provides only that a pattern "requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity" within a ten year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
145. See, e.g., 182 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(2) (1987). Other states
with the same or similar definitions include: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
895.02(4) (West 1981); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(2) (1980); Idaho, IDAHO
CODE § 18-7803(d) (1989); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 11, §
1352(c) (West 1983); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.390 (Michie 1983);
New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:41-1(a) (1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75D-3(B) (1986); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1983); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-1-1003(6) (1986); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.82.010 (15) (1985); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West 1985). The
word "purposes" is substituted for "intents," and the word "participants" is
substituted for "accomplices" in several of the statutes.
[Vol. 55
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Special Offender Sentencing Act 46 and is the same language that the
Supreme Court approved for the relationship prong of the test for
pattern. 147 The test for whether to use specific language to define
pattern should be whether the language clarifies the term or further
confuses any understanding of it: Justice Scalia thought the above
language would do the latter:
It hardly closes in on the target to know that "relatedness" refers to
acts that are related by "purposes, results, participants, victims...
methods of commission, or [just in case that is not vague enough]
otherwise." Is the fact that the victims of both predicate acts were
women enough? Or that both acts had the purpose of enriching the
defendant? ... I doubt that the lower courts will find the Court's
instructions much more helpful than telling them to look for a
'pattern'-which is what the statute already says.1"
This proposed language, however, does clarify what constitutes pattern.
"Purposes," "results," "participants," "victims" and "methods of commis-
sion" are not abstractions. They are similar to language used in the
criminal law context, and would require as much litigation to define as
does, for example, "intentional infliction of emotional distress." These
terms are far less ambiguous than the majority's "open- and close-ended
concept" terminology used in .J. Inc.149 Perhaps most importantly,
they are terms that cumulatively begin to bring the word "pattern" out
of the abstract. One would begin to see a pattern if similar victims
repeatedly appeared, or the criminal used the same method of commis-
sion to accomplish the crime. Finally, the language arguably is not
unconstitutionally vague if the Supreme Court has used it for the same
purpose.
The Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act"5 is a model example
of a definition of pattern. The statute reads in relevant part:
"Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful
activity which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken
together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct
and be related either to each other or to the enterprise .... The most
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
147. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2901; see also supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text.
148. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2907.
149. Id at 2901.
150. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(2) (1987).
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recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity... shall
have occurred within five years of the commission of the next
preceding act alleged as part of the pattern.
151
Note the important aspects of the Utah statute. The three acts must be:
(1) not isolated, which means similar purposes, victims, etc. and (2)
cumulatively must demonstrate continuity and relationship to each
other or to the enterprise. The Utah RICO statute differs from federal
RICO in that it requires three acts. It contains the "purposes" lan-
guage, however, and the two prong relationship/continuity test from
H.J. Inc. It therefore does not diverge entirely from established RICO
concepts.
While the language of the Utah statute is more concrete than the
H.J. Inc. test, because it gives defendants better notice of what
constitutes a RICO offense, the language is not so specific that it
detracts from Congress' intention to keep the statute broad to reach as
many defendants as possible. It is sufficiently broad because the
continuity/relationship requirement counterbalances any fear by
prosecutors that the "purposes" language narrows the definition too
much. Additionally, the language "or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics" is a catch-all phrase so 'that the
"purposes" language is not exhaustive.
The statute is more concrete than H.J Inc. because three acts
instead of two replace the "open- and close-ended," language which
reduces the number of vague terms which will have to be litigated.
Three acts which must have "similar purposes, results, victims, or
methods of commission" constitute a total definition. As discussed
previously, the terms "victims," "purposes," "methods of commission,"
and "results" are more recognizable as a starting point to define than an
"open- and close-ended" concept. Thus there would be no need for the
extra "open- and close-ended concept" language. The statute indicates
that continuity and relationship are shown by a totality of circum-
stances using the "purposes" language. The statute focuses primarily
on the "purposes" language, while H.. Inc. included the language only
to cover its relationship prong. H.J. Inc. focused on relation-
ship/continuity, which is more ambiguous than the "purposes" language,
and injected yet more ambiguous language, the "open- and close-ended
concept" language, to explain the continuity prong of the test. By doing
so, H.J. Inc. over-complicated the pattern requirement. The Utah RICO
statute is efficient but carries less baggage.
The Utah definition of pattern requires less analysis to achieve the
same result as the pattern definition used in H.J. Inc. It is still broad
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terms are less abstract which means less litigation over their meaning.
Remaining silent in H.R. 1046 and letting H.J. Inc. stand does not
remove the possibility that Congress may step in to amend the statute
in the future. If Congress arrives at a consensus on a definition of
pattern and includes it in H.R. 1046, judges and attorneys could rely on
a set definition without fear that H.J. Inc. could be moot in the future.
Timing this close to H.J. Inc. is crucial. If Congress is ever going to
change RICO to include a definition of pattern, it should do so immedi-
ately. Otherwise the circuits will begin relying on H.J. Inc. as the
definitive word on the subject.
If included in H.R. 1046, the Utah definition of pattern would
clarify RICO. The Utah definition does not sacrifice the interests of the
prosecutor, plaintiff, defendant, or judge. Defining pattern, as a crucial
potion of RICO, is the proper responsibility of Congress, and should be
done now before H.J. In. becomes solidified as precedent.
JOHN BIOFF
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